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The third pillar of the Basel II highlights the role of market discipline in easing the 
existing pressure on traditional monitoring measures like capital requirement and 
government supervision. This study test the effectiveness of market discipline in inducing 
prudential risk management practices among the East Asian banks over the 1995 to 2005 
period. Market discipline is measured using information disclosure and interbank deposit 
holdings. We find that only the latter is an effective market discipline tool. However, the 
former becomes effective when market concentration is higher. We find that government 
owned, foreign owned and recapilatised banks are subject to market disciplining when 
disclosure in taken account but the opposite is true when interbank deposits is taken into 
account. Finally, we find that banks that disclose more risk related information hold more 
capital against their non-performing loan. The implications of the findings are discussed.  
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East Asian Banks 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Regulation and supervision in banking is intended to protect retail depositors 
and avoid the substantial welfare costs associated with bank failures. Nevertheless, 
deriving optimal regulation in the banking industry is not an easy task due to the 
costs involved, political pressure or interest group pressure. In light of these 
considerations, market discipline is highlighted as one of the key areas of the 
reform policy in the banking sector. The recent financial crisis highlights the 
problems of moral hazard and asymmetric information which are rampant in the 
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banking sector. In line with this, the reforms proposed in the Basel III require 
banks to provide a more relevant and timely information to the stakeholders that 
enable them to better assess banks’ overall capital adequacy and risk profile. Greater 
disclosure not only improves prudential regulations but more importantly it facilitates 
effective market discipline. This shows that issues related to market discipline in 
banking sector are important and remain relevant in the era of Basel III.  
Market discipline involves monitoring and influencing by investors (Bliss and 
Flannery, 2002). Monitoring refers to the investors’ capability of assessing a firm’s 
actual situation and sending market signals to the managers. However, it is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for market discipline (Bliss, 2004). For 
market discipline to be effective, it must involve influencing. This happens when 
bank managers respond to investors’ feedback that is reflected in their withdrawal 
actions or price movements by making more conservative decisions and safer 
investments (Goldberg and Hudgins, 2002). In this case, Greenspan (2001) asserts 
that market discipline acts as a ‘private counter party supervision’ in the banking 
sector that enables stakeholders to safeguard their interest against excessive risk 
taking by banks. This present study aims to analyze the effectiveness of market 
discipline in limiting banks’ risk taking behavior. More specifically, it aims to find 
if market discipline provides banks with the incentive to hold adequate amount of 
capital as a cushion against potential future losses that may arise from their risk 
exposure.   
Most of the empirical studies have tested the effectiveness of market discipline 
by focusing on the monitoring aspect. In the context of East Asia, studies by 
Hosono et al. (2005) and Hamid (2014) confirm that depositors discipline banks 
by withdrawing their funds from the weaker ones. Nevertheless, with the exception 
of Nier and Baumann (2006) and Wu and Bowe (2010), not many studies have 
empirically tested the ability of market discipline in influencing banks’ risk taking 
behavior. The latter study is focused on China while the former is focused on 
developed countries. This paper complements the existing literature by carrying 
out similar analyses on the East Asian banks. The findings of this study can be 
used to identify whether market discipline tools are effective in encouraging 
greater prudence among bank managers. In addition, the findings can also 
identify under what circumstances market discipline becomes more effective. 
This will give us a better perspective about how the role of market discipline can 
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be enhanced so that it can facilitate in reducing the social cost associated with bank 
supervision.   
In this paper, we study the extent to which market discipline exists in the East 
Asian banking sector. This banking sector is chosen for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, banks have traditionally played a very important role in the East Asian 
economies. Banks in the region have undergone rapid liberalization, financial 
crisis and reform during the period studied. This study aims to examine whether 
the changes that have taken in the banking system have influenced banks’ risk 
taking behavior. More specifically, given the fact that many bank failures happened 
during this period and large amounts of public funds were used to bail out weak 
banks (Hamid, 2013), this study aims to examine if market discipline was effective 
in influencing banks’ risk taking behavior during this period. Secondly, the 1997 
financial crisis had a very damaging effect on the East Asian banking sector. A large 
number of banks were insolvent and had to be recapitalized, merged or acquired or 
closed subsequently. This reduced the number of players in the industry. The banking 
system in East Asia became more concentrated as a result. In line with “too big to 
fail” theory, larger bank operations increase market power and encourage greater 
risk taking as evidenced in studies by De Nicoló et al. (2006). Thus, we examine 
whether greater market concentration has a negative effect on the effectiveness of 
market discipline. 
Thirdly, government ownership of banks is prevalent in the East Asian banking 
system as highlighted in studies by Laeven and Levine (2009), Williams and Nguyen 
(2005) and Micco et al. (2007). The “political” theory links government ownership of 
institutions to inefficient allocation of resources allocation. Existing studies 
confirm that government ownership is associated to lower performance (La Porta 
et al., 2002), lower efficiency (Williams and Nguyen, 2005) and higher risk (Wu 
and Bowe, 2010). Given that government owned banks are more likely to be bailed 
out in the event of a financial distress compared to others, they may be less 
sensitive to external pressure. Hence, this study examines whether this is true in 
the case of the East Asian banking system. Lastly, foreign ownership of banks in 
East Asia has been linked to greater efficiency (Laeven, 1999), lower financial 
fragility (Arena, 2008; Hamid, 2013) and lower likelihood of crisis (Barth et al., 
2004). Thus, we examine whether foreign owned banks are more sensitive to 
market based disciplinary mechanism. 
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Overall, the results of this study confirm that information disclosure is an 
effective market discipline mechanism when market concentration is higher. 
However, interbank deposits lose their effectiveness when the market becomes 
more concentrated. We also find that disclosure is an effective market discipline 
tool for government owned banks, foreign banks and recapitalized banks but 
interbank deposits are not. Finally, we find that the effectiveness of information 
disclosure depends on the level of banks’ loan quality. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section II provides an overview of the 
literature review. Section III provides the model descriptions. The empirical 
results are discussed in Section IV. Section V concludes the paper. 
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Pillar 3 of Basel II emphasizes the role of market discipline as an additional tool 
that complements the minimum capital requirements and supervisory review 
process in promoting a safe and sound banking system. Market discipline can be 
signaled by all three groups of bank shareholders: depositors, debt holders and 
equity holders (Flannery, 2001). Stakeholders can discipline banks using a price-based 
approach and a quantity-based approach. Under the first approach stakeholders 
demand higher return as a compensation for high risk taking, while under the 
second approach stakeholder discipline risky banks by withdrawing their funds.1 
As highlighted by Berger (1991), Flannery (2001) and Hamalainen et al. (2001), 
most of the earlier literature has been mainly focused on identifying whether 
stakeholders discipline banks using the two approaches. However, Bliss and 
Flannery (2002) assert the effectiveness of market discipline need to be assessed 
based on its ability in influencing banks’ risk taking behavior. In line with this, 
studies by Cordella and Levy Yeyati (1998) and Blum (2002) show that the ability 
of market in inducing prudential behavior among bank mangers depends on the 
visibility of banks risk choices and the amount of uninsured deposits.  
 
1 Studies by Baer and Brewer (1986), Ellis and Flannery (1992), Cook and Spellman (1994) find 
that there is a positive relationship between the rate of large uninsured CDs of US banks, and the 
riskiness of the banks. On the other hand, studies by Goldberg and Hudgins (1996), Calomiris and 
Mason (1997), Martinez Peria and Schmukler (1999) find a positive relationship between banks’ 
risk and deposit withdrawals. 
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Information disclosure is a prerequisite for market discipline (Hamalainen et al., 
2003). Stakeholders’ ability to differentiate between good and bad banks will 
depend on the quantity and quality of information disclosed by banks. In line with 
this, Pillar 3 emphasizes on the role of information disclosure in strengthening 
market discipline. Theoretical models developed by Blum (2002), Boot and 
Schmeits (2000), Cordella and Levy Yeyati (1998) postulate that banks that 
voluntarily disclose more information about their risk exposure will select a lower 
default risk in equilibrium. Since more disclosure exposes banks to greater public 
scrutiny, stakeholders will demand higher compensation from risky banks as 
shown by Baer and Brewer (1986), Ellis and Flannery (1992) and Cook and 
Spellman (1994). As a result, banks need to ensure that their risk taking incentives 
are readjusted to other banks which do not disclose as much information. The 
effectiveness of disclosure in promoting a safer banking system is confirmed by 
Tadesse (2006). Using the data on 49 countries, this study finds that banking crises 
are less likely in countries with better disclosure. 
Theoretical models developed by Diamond and Dybvig (1986) and Flannery 
(1994) assert that deposit insurance reduces depositors’ incentive to monitor banks’ 
risk taking. Hence, they postulate that market discipline is likely to be more 
effective when the amount of uninsured funding is larger for a given rise in bank 
risk. Goldberg and Hudgins (2002) analyzed the relationship between uninsured 
deposits and financial institutional failures in United States for the period from 
1984 to 1994. They find that failed institutions have lower proportions of uninsured 
deposits-to-total-deposits before the failure and that failing institutions attract fewer 
deposits from uninsured depositors before the failure than do solvent institutions. 
This implies that the effectiveness of market discipline is linked to the amount of 
uninsured deposits. Existing studies by Gropp and Vesala (2004), Hoang et al. 
(2014) have also tested the proposed relationship and find that banks that have 
larger amount of uninsured funding take less risk.   
A theoretical model developed by Cordella and Levy Yeyati (1998) and Blum 
(2002) asserts that banks’ risk choices will be efficient in the event that bank 
deposits are not insured and the bank’s risk choices are visible to the depositors. 
This happens because the banks incorporate the impact of their risk choice on 
depositors given that depositor will demand higher compensation from banks that 
incur higher risks. In line with this proposition, Nier and Baumann (2006) 
developed an empirical model to test the effectiveness of market discipline in 
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reducing excessive risk taking behavior by banks that depends on the extent to 
which the bank is financed by uninsured liabilities and the observability of bank 
risk choices.  
They used the model to test the effectiveness of market discipline in 32 
developed countries. Wu and Bowe (2010) used a similar model for banks in China. 
They find a positive relationship between information disclosure and a bank’s 
equity capital. In line with the proposition of signaling theory, their findings 
confirm that greater risk-related disclosure is associated with lower risk taking by 
bank managers. This suggests that safer banks are more transparent. In addition, 
both studies also find that banks that have larger amount of uninsured funding take 
less risk. Overall, their findings confirm that market discipline provides banks with 
an incentive to maintain a strong capital base as a cushion against potential future 
losses arising from their risk exposure.  
This paper contributes towards existing literature by analyzing the effectiveness 
of market discipline in encouraging a more prudential risk taking behavior among 
bank managers in the East Asian banking sector. Using the model developed by 
Nier and Baumann (2006), this study will directly test the effect of market 
discipline on banks’ risk taking behavior measured using the Basel criteria definition 
of total capital over risk-weighted assets. Given the consolidation that has taken 
place in the East Asian banking sector, this study will test if the effect of market 
discipline becomes weaker as a result of increased market concentration. The 
effectiveness of market discipline will also be tested by taking into account the 
ownership structure of the banks. Analysis on banks risk taking incentives is 
performed for the period from before crisis to after crisis (i.e. 1995 to 2005). The 
analyses will be carried out using panel data random effect model. 
 
III. METHODOLOGY 
 
This paper aims to analyze the effectiveness of market discipline in influencing 
banks’ risk taking behavior. To empirically test this hypothesis, a model that 
represents a general relationship between bank capital, bank-specific variables, 
market discipline measures and country-specific variables is formulated following 
by Nier and Baumann (2006), Wu and Bowe (2010). The model is given as: 
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Capitali,j,t  = o + 1ROAi,j,t + 2NPLi,j,t + 3Sizei,j,t + 4Market Disciplinei,j,t + 
5Ownershipi,j,t + 6GDPj,t + 7GDP per Capitaj,t + 8Concentrationj,t + i,j,t   
(Equation 1) 
 
such that i =1,...,N ; j =1,...,J ; and t =1,...,T. Capital is the dependent variable which 
is defined as the total capital ratio for individual bank i at time t in country j. n is 
the number of banks in each country. j is the number of countries (i.e. 5 countries). 
t is the number of observations per bank (i,t varies because the panel is unbalanced). 
 is the error term.   
 
1. Dependent Variable 
 
Capital buffer enables banks to avoid bankruptcy (Kim and Santomero, 1998; 
Diamond and Rajan, 2000). In line with this, the 1988 Basel Accord emphasizes 
on the management of capital as a tool to measure banks’ insolvency risk. In the 
event of financial distress, banks with higher buffer can use the excess capital to 
cover for losses and overcome the difficulties in raising fresh capital (Fonseca and 
Gonzalez, 2010). Banks also hold excess capital in order not to incur the costs 
associated with market discipline (Flannery and Rangan, 2008; Nier and Baumann, 
2006; Wu and Bowe, 2010). In line with studies by Aggarwal and Jacques (1998), 
Jacques and Nigro (1997), Nier and Baumann (2006), Wu and Bowe (2010), the 
ratio of bank capital to risk-weighted assets (RCWA) based on the Basel criteria is 
used as a measure of banks’ capital.   
 
2. Market Discipline Variables  
 
Based on Nier and Baumann (2006), Wu and Bowe (2010), we used two bank-
specific variables to measure the strength of market discipline.       
 
i) Information Disclosure 
 
Compared to banks that do not disclose risk-related information to the public, 
banks that do are likely to hold more capital in relation to their risky assets.  
Disclosure Index is one of the commonly used disclosure variables in the existing 
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literature.2 Disclosure Index consists of the list of selected accounting information 
that can be disclosed in the company report (Marston and Shrives, 1991). More 
specifically, Hassan and Marston (2010) define the disclosure index as “a research 
instrument to measure the extent of information reported in a particular disclosure 
vehicle(s) by a particular entity(s) according to a list of selected items of 
information.”   
Disclosure Index is measured based on the measurement framework proposed 
by Erlend Nier from the Bank of England. The index for each bank is derived 
using the amount of information available in banks’ annual report on fifteen core 
disclosure items as reported in the Fitch IBCA BankScope database. This 
disclosure index is constructed using the check box approach similar to the CIFAR 
(Center for International Financial Analysis Research) index, but it is constructed 
at the bank level.3 This index consists of sub-indices that represent 15 categories 
of disclosure related to interest-rate risk, credit risk, liquidity risk, market risk, and 
capital (see Appendix). These items are very compatible with the frameworks 
proposed by IMF’s Financial Soundness Indicators (FSI) and Basel Committee 
(Huang, 2006). Studies by Nier and Baumann (2004), Huang (2006), Nier and 
Baumann (2006), Wu and Bowe (2010), Hamid (2014) have used this index. Based 
on the empirical framework proposed by Nier and Baumann (2006) and Wu and 
Bowe (2010), we posit that greater information disclosure should be positively 
related to a bank’s equity capital in order for market discipline to be effective.   
 
ii) Interbank 
 
Existing literature suggests that market discipline is more effective when the 
amount of uninsured funding is higher. In line with studies by Enkhbold and 
Otgonshar (2013), Nier and Baumann (2006) and Wu and Bowe (2010), interbank 
deposits are used as a proxy for uninsured funding. This variable is measured by 
the ratio of bank deposits to total deposits.4 Since banks are exposed to similar 
 
2 Marston and Shrives (1991) provides survey of the use of disclosure indices. Hassan and Marston 
(2010) provide the comprehensive survey of the use of various disclosure proxies. 
3 CIFAR index consist of ninety items that are included in the companies’ annual report. Seventy 
percent of the companies are involved in the non-financial sector. 
4 Interbank deposits is used as a variable to measure uninsured funding due to lack of data on 
subordinated debt for some East Asian countries.  
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shocks to risks, banks are likely to be more informed investors in the interbank 
market. As a result, funding provided by banks is likely to be more sensitive to 
lenders risk exposure. In addition, interbank depositors also have more incentive 
in disciplining banks compared to other depositors because their deposits are not 
covered by the deposits insurance plans. Based on the theoretical and empirical 
framework proposed by Flannery (1994) and Sironi (2001), we predict that the 
effect of market discipline should be stronger when the amount of bank deposits is 
higher. Hence, we expect a positive relationship between interbank deposit and 
capital ratio. 
 
3. Bank Specific Variables 
 
Banks can either generate capital externally or internally. The latter is a cheaper 
source of funds compared to the former. Banks with higher profitability can 
generate more capital internally through retained earnings compared to less 
profitable banks. In this study, ROA is used as the measure of banks’ ability to 
raise funds internally. It is measured as the pre-tax profits over total assets.  
Studies by Gropp and Heider (2009), Kleff and Weber (2008) find that profitable 
banks tend to have relatively more equity. NPL is defined as the ratio of non-
performing loans to total loans. It is a measurement of banks’ credit risk. Higher 
ratio indicates that the banks have poor loan quality. Following studies by Ayuso 
et al. (2004), Nier and Baumann (2006), Wu and Bowe (2010), the size of the banks 
is controlled for. Size is measured as the natural logarithm of Total Assets. Larger 
banks are exposed to lower idiosyncratic risks due to greater diversification. As a 
result, they may have less incentive to hold high capital buffer against losses. On 
the other hand, smaller banks may find it difficult to obtain capital, and as result, 
may need to hold higher capital buffer.   
 
4. Country Specific Variables 
 
The level of capital is also influenced by economic growth (Borio et al., 2001). 
Banks make more profit when economic growth is high and this may contribute 
towards higher capital holdings. Studies by Asarkaya and Ozcan (2007), Nier and 
Baumann (2006), Wu and Bowe (2010) have used GDP growth to control for the 
business cycle. The movements of capital is procyclical as banks’ capital increases 
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during good times through retained earnings but decreases during bad times due to 
lower earnings and difficulties in raising fresh capital.5  However, a study by 
Jokipii and Milne (2008) finds a negative relationship between capital and business 
cycle. In line with these studies, we include GDP as a country-specific variable 
that measures the annual percentage growth rate of GDP. Since East Asian 
economies often show co-movement in their business cycles, we have included 
GDP per capita and country dummy as additional variables to control for country 
specific effect.       
In line with Wu and Bowe (2010), we use Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 
and four bank concentration ratio (CR4) as measures of banking sector concentration. 
HHI is defined as the sum of the squares of market shares of all the banks in a 
country, where the market shares are measured using total assets as a proxy for 
bank size. HHI gives higher weight to larger banks compared to the smaller ones. 
Higher HHI is associated with greater concentration in the banking industry while 
lower HHI is associated with greater competition in the industry. CR4 is measured 
using the total deposit of the four largest banks to the total deposits of all the 
banks in the sample for each country in a given year. CR4 will be equal to 1 in a 
pure monopolistic market and equal to 0 in a perfectly competitive market. 
The banking sector restructuring that happened in East Asia as a result of the 
crisis has increased market concentration in the region (Williams and Nguyen, 
2005). Hence, in this study we want to finds out how these changes influence the 
effectiveness of market discipline.       
 
5. Estimation Procedure 
 
The effectiveness of market discipline in the East Asian banking sector is 
measured using Equation 1. Further analyses are performed using Equation 2 to 
investigate the link between market discipline and market concentration. In doing 
so, two of the market concentration variables are introduced separately and the 
interaction term of market concentration and market discipline variables are 
included as a moderator in the following specification: 
 
 
5 One of the reasons for this is the pro-cyclical nature of loan demand (Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 
2004; Stolz and Wedow, 2011; Tabak et al., 2011). 
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Capitali,j,t  = o + 1ROAi,j,t + 2NPLi,j,t + 3Sizei,j,t + 4Market Disciplinei,j,t + 
5Ownershipi,j,t + 6GDPj,t + 7GDP per Capitaj,t + 8Concentrationj,t +  
9Market Disciplinei,j,t * Concentrationj,t + i,j,t   
  (Equation 2) 
 
Based on the above equation, we expect a positive coefficient for 4 and a 
negative coefficient for 8. This would suggest that greater concentration reduces 
the effectiveness of market discipline.   
Studies have also linked ownership structure with bank capital (Nier and 
Baumann, 2006; Schaeck and Cihak, 2007; Tabak et al., 2011; Wu and Bowe, 
2010). State-owned banks are more likely to hold less capital buffer than private 
banks (Tabak et al., 2011). This happens because they are often politically-linked, 
and as a result it is easier for them to raise new capital. State-owned banks capital 
buffer is also found to be less sensitive to the level of risk (Wu and Bowe, 2010).  
In contrast, Bongini et al. (2001) find that foreign-owned banks practice a more 
sophisticated corporate governance system and as a result are more efficient in 
managing risk. Hence, they can be expected to hold higher capital buffers. We 
therefore incorporate two variables that capture government and foreign ownership. 
In addition, we take into account the banks’ listing status in the stock exchange. 
Studies by Nier and Baumann (2006) and Wu and Bowe (2010) confirm that listed 
banks hold more capital. A number of banks in East Asia were recapitalized as part 
of the bank restructuring exercise. We also take this into account in our study. 
Analyses are also performed by taking into account the effect of bank ownership 
on market discipline based on the following specification: 
 
Capitali,j,t  = o + 1ROAi,j,t + 2NPLi,j,t + 3Sizei,j,t + 4Market Disciplinei,j,t +  
5Ownershipi,j,t + 6GDPj,t + 7GDP per Capitaj,t + 8Concentrationj,t + 
9 Market Disciplinei,j,t * Ownershipi,j,t + i,j,t 
  (Equation 3) 
 
A diagnostic test on the residuals of the basic pooled Ordinary Least Square 
(OLS) regressions shows that the residuals are not normal. This implies that 
Generalized Least Square (GLS) procedure is preferable compared to OLS. Hence, 
the estimation is performed using random effect panel (GLS) models. Given that 
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the bank ownership dummy variables do not exhibit substantial time-invariance, 
random effect model is preferred over the fixed-effect ones.    
In analyzing the effectiveness of market discipline on a bank’s prudential risk 
management decisions, there might still be an issue of some variables not being 
exogenous with respect to bank risk (i.e. they are correlated with the error terms). 
As argued by Nier and Baumann (2006) and Wu and Bowe (2010), banks’ decision 
to raise more capital may influence their decision to disclose more risk-related 
information or engage in the inter-bank deposits market. For example, a bank that 
plans to raise more equity may need to disclose more information about their risk 
choices in order to attract capital. Estimations that are carried out without 
controlling for the potential endogeneity between the dependent and independent 
variables can be misleading.   
Two-Stage Least Square (2SLS) analyses are performed in order to account for 
the possible endogeneity of the market discipline variables with respect to bank 
risk (i.e. they are correlated with the error terms). The instruments that are used in 
the analyses include ownership dummies, ROA, LogAsset, the loan to asset ratio 
defined as total loans to total assets, the cost to income ratio defined as overheads 
over net interest revenues plus operating incomes, and yearly time dummies. We 
have used the current year value for all the bank specific variables. While all of 
these variables are endogenous over longer horizons, they are unlikely to be 
controlled by the bank over a one-year period and are therefore taken as exogenous 
as suggested by Nier and Baumann (2006). Given that both of the market discipline 
variables exhibit time-varying characteristics, yearly time dummies are included 
in the first stage regressions.   
 
IV. RESULTS 
 
1. Data Description 
 
The analysis is performed using the sample of commercial banks in five East 
Asian countries namely Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand. 
Bank level data is obtained from BankScope. The database for each bank is 
obtained for the period from 1995 to 2005. Country level macroeconomic data is 
obtained from the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics 
database. Data on bank ownership and recapitalization in the five East Asian 
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countries is obtained from BankScope, banks’ and central banks’ website. All 
commercial bank data that is available from BankScope are used for our analysis. 
This yielded an initial sample of 122 banks that have data on Capital Ratio. The 
number of observation available for the regression analysis changes according to 
the variables used in the regressions.  
Table 1 shows the summary statistics of the bank specific, macroeconomic and 
market discipline variables. The dataset displays the overall, between and within 
variations of the variables. The results show that the within variations of the bank 
specific and market discipline variables for the aggregate banking system are lower 
compared to the between variations.6 This highlights the importance of analyzing 
the cross-sectional dimension of the data. The results also show that foreign owned 
banks hold higher capital on average. The between and overtime variations of the 
capital ratio are higher for the government owned banks compared to others. This 
suggests that there are noticeable differences in the level of capital holdings among 
the government owned banks and government owned banks have experienced 
significant structural changes to their capital ratio during the sample period. 
Foreign banks have higher ROA and NPL/Loans on average and higher variations 
in the two variables compared to other banks. Government owned banks and 
recapitalized banks are bigger in size. Moreover, time variation in size is 
noticeably lower compared to between variations in size for all categories of banks. 
This suggests that there are significant differences in the sizes of the banks. As far 
as the market discipline variables are concerned, we find that foreign banks have 
highest Interbank deposits on average compared to other banks while listed banks 
have lower Interbank deposits compared to other banks. In addition, variation in 
Interbank deposits between all categories of banks is higher compared to variations 
in time. Particularly, we find that government owned banks have approximately 
three times larger variation in Interbank deposits between banks compared to 
variation in Interbank deposits over time.   
  
 
6 Except for ROA which has higher within variation. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics  
Variable Obs Mean Std 
Between 
Std 
Within 
Std 
Min Max 
Bank Specific Variables        
Capital Ratio  831 19.43 24.53 18.85 14.80 -236.20 296.70 
Gov. Owned 125 18.65 44.75 34.77 26.23 -236.20 296.70 
Foreign Owned 219 26.15 25.08 18.82 16.79 -43.70 190.01 
Listed  390 13.61 16.13 8.54 13.80 -236.20 65.69 
Recapitalised 68 12.43 9.47 2.17 9.26 -47.40 33.20 
ROA 1639 0.30 7.37 2.62 6.90 -112.21 119.99 
Gov. Owned 227 -0.31 6.20 2.34 5.67 -70.56 7.72 
Foreign Owned 358 1.05 8.85 15.72 12.95 -94.99 71.32 
Listed  803 -0.35 7.08 2.89 6.54 -112.21 28.16 
Recapitalised 108 -0.32 4.88 1.59 4.64 -40.20 8.84 
NPL/Loans 692 12.58 14.32 11.28 10.18 0.10 90.00 
Gov. Owned 99 11.85 8.67 6.97 5.39 0.40 37.70 
Foreign Owned 213 15.19 18.19 15.72 12.95 0.10 90.00 
Listed  296 11.44 13.40 9.83 9.81 0.20 81.40 
Recapitalised 47 15.29 15.11 7.64 13.53 1.20 72.40 
Log Assets 1638 14.11 1.95 1.89 0.41 9.27 9.01 
Gov. Owned 227 15.58 1.38 1.39 0.36 12.27 18.27 
Foreign Owned 358 13.01 1.35 1.29 0.44 10.19 16.12 
Listed  803 14.85 1.91 1.88 0.41 9.92 19.01 
Recapitalised 108 15.80 1.37 1.38 0.36 13.04 18.69 
Macroeconomic Variables        
GDP Growth 1639 4.47 4.62 0.78 4.56 -13.13 10.00 
GDP Per Capita 1639 3004.31 3649.10 3350.34 1464.04 3.01 13303.82 
CR4  1639 55.79 9.79 6.26 7.54 30.24 77.51 
HHI 1639 0.13 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.36 
Market Discipline Variables        
Information 1327 11.57 2.19 1.95 1.32 4.00 17.00 
Gov. Owned 187 11.86 2.30 1.87 1.55 4.00 17.00 
Foreign Owned 337 11.39 1.98 1.52 1.25 5.00 15.00 
Listed  612 11.85 2.37 2.16 1.50 4.00 17.00 
Recapitalised 99 12.30 1.95 1.05 1.68 7.00 15.00 
Interbank Deposits 1061 13.95 18.92 18.54 9.50 0.00 100.00 
Gov. Owned 152 12.89 15.07 19.95 5.78 0.00 100.00 
Foreign Owned 235 27.27 25.24 22.65 13.84 0.00 97.40 
Listed  531 7.52 10.84 12.20 7.53 0.00 91.82 
Recapitalised 86 7.86 12.23 10.82 7.96 0.00 51.34 
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2. Empirical Findings 
 
The results in Table 2 show that ROA has a positive and significant effect on 
bank capital. This suggests that profitable banks hold more capital. The results 
show that there is no significant relationship between NPL and capital ratio.7 The 
coefficients on Log Assets are negative and significant in all specifications. This 
confirms that bigger banks hold less capital. This finding is in line with Nier and 
Baumann (2006), Wu and Bowe (2010). Both CR4 and HERF do not have 
significant relationship with bank capital. 8  This evidence indicates that bank 
capital buffers are not sensitive to competition in the banking sector. Moreover, 
we also find that GDP growth have significant and positive effect on bank capital 
holdings in specifications 1 and 3, while GDP per capita have significant and 
positive effect on bank capital holdings in specifications 1, 2 and 5. These suggest 
that banks hold more capital when economic growth and income are higher.  
The effectiveness of market discipline is analyzed using two variables; Information 
and Interbank deposits. Banks that disclose more risk related information invite 
public scrutiny. Hence, they should realign their risk taking incentive to other 
banks that do not disclose similar information by holding more capital as a buffer 
against risky assets. However, results in Table 3 show that banks which publicly 
disclose more accounting information maintain a significantly lower capital ratio. 
This suggests that disclosure does not induce East Asian banks to take lower risks. 
The ability of a bank to obtain funding from the interbank market in a way reflects 
how other banks perceive its risk profile. Since bank deposits are not insured and 
banks are more informed about the risk profiles of other banks, a bank with higher 
interbank deposits may need to hold higher capital as compensation. The results in 
column 3 and 4 confirm that banks that borrow more from the interbank market 
maintain a significantly higher capital ratio. This confirms the effectiveness of 
interbank deposits as a market discipline tool. The findings also show that foreign 
banks hold lower capital while listed banks hold higher capital.      
 
 
 
 
7 The positive effect on capital is only significant in specifications 1. 
8 Only CR4 is significant in specifications 1. 
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Table 2. A Basic Model on Bank Capital 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ROA 
1.354*** 1.037*** 0.954*** 1.075*** 1.050*** 1.099*** 
(0.213) (0.188) (0.321) (0.196) (0.198) (0.206) 
NPL/Loans 
0.311** 0.0629 0.189 -0.0123 0.0741 0.00949 
(0.145) (0.203) (0.175) (0.208) (0.198) (0.201) 
Log Assets 
-5.098*** -5.645*** -3.007*** -21.01*** -5.665*** -21.09*** 
(0.750) (1.657) (0.983) (6.305) (1.656) (6.284) 
CR4 
-0.341** -0.140 -0.184 -0.107   
(0.134) (0.215) (0.282) (0.226)   
HHI 
    -22.98 -26.47 
    (32.35) (33.44) 
GDP Growth 
0.238* 0.0724 1.258* 0.142 0.0649 0.154 
(0.145) (0.136) (0.741) (0.162) (0.118) (0.144) 
GDP Per Capita 
0.001*** 0.000* -0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Country Dummy 
-0.0617 0.292 -2.063  0.143  
(0.659) (1.106) (1.609)  (1.193)  
Year 
1.637*** 1.704*** 0.974 3.191*** 1.656*** 3.118*** 
(0.368) (0.611) (0.825) (0.952) (0.575) (0.909) 
Constant 
-3,170*** -3,307*** -1,878 -6,060*** -3,214*** -5,914*** 
(722.1) (1,195) (1,645) (1,814) (1,130) (1,734) 
Type of 
Estimation 
OLS 
Random 
Effect 
Between 
Effect 
Fixed 
Effect 
Random 
Effect 
Fixed 
Effect 
Observations 536 536 536 536 536 536 
Banks  122 122 122 122 122 
R-squared 0.304   0.281 0.300   0.304 
Robust standard errors in parentheses and *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3. The Effect of Market Discipline on Bank Capital 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Information 
-38.43** -33.63**   
(15.94) (14.20)   
Interbank Deposits 
  2.596*** 2.442*** 
  (0.789) (0.684) 
CR4 
0.214  0.703  
(0.489)  (0.517)  
HHI 
 -83.96  33.10 
 (58.90)  (53.79) 
ROA 
1.382** 1.345*** 3.109*** 3.164*** 
(0.565) (0.497) (0.694) (0.646) 
NPL/Loans 
-0.175 -0.0769 0.355* 0.420** 
(0.256) (0.215) (0.194) (0.187) 
Log Assets 
-0.355 -2.049 -5.728*** -5.389*** 
(3.140) (2.634) (1.920) (1.704) 
Government Owned 
12.35 13.88 -1.151 -1.145 
(10.46) (10.10) (7.944) (6.777) 
Foreign Owned 
15.68 14.25 -27.65** -25.83** 
(10.42) (9.872) (12.02) (10.43) 
Listed 
27.63* 28.46* 22.32** 22.71*** 
(14.74) (14.72) (9.024) (8.010) 
Recapitalised 
21.36 19.66 4.570 5.275 
(14.71) (13.90) (8.996) (7.834) 
GDP Growth 
-0.518 -0.252 -0.267 -0.0407 
(0.576) (0.452) (0.427) (0.386) 
GDP Per Capita 
0.001 0.000 0.002** 0.002* 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Country Dummy 
8.372* 4.435 -0.235 -2.114 
(4.576) (3.452) (2.540) (2.293) 
Year 
5.116*** 4.435*** 2.085*** 1.972*** 
(1.632) (1.372) (0.692) (0.676) 
Constant 
-9,767*** -8,411*** -4,159*** -3,895*** 
(3,133) (2,617) (1,385) (1,351) 
Observations 513 513 443 443 
Banks 117 117 102 102 
Goodness of Fit 0.137 0.144 0.153 0.158 
Wald chi (2) 21.24** 24.65** 43.56*** 51.96*** 
Standard errors in parentheses and *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Major consolidation that took place on the East Asian banking sector after the 
crisis increased the market concentration in the banking sector. Based on Wu and 
Bowe (2010), we postulate that banks’ incentives to hold more capital in relation 
to their risk weighted assets will be mediated by the degree of competition in the 
banking sector. In doing so, we include the interactive term of two concentration 
ratios with two market discipline variables; Information and Interbank. Table 4 
presents the results. The interaction terms of Disclosure and concentration 
variables are shown to be positive and significant. This evidence suggests that 
disclosure becomes an effective market discipline tool when the banking sector 
becomes more concentrated. This could be due to fact that the consolidations that 
happened in East Asia removed weaker banks from the banking sector (Ito and 
Hashimoto, 2007). This suggests that disclosure becomes an effective market 
disciplining tool when there are stronger players in the banking system. In contrast, 
Wu and Bowe (2010) find that disclosure is linked lower capital holdings when 
market concentration increases. This could be due to the fact that greater market 
concentration in China is linked to increase in the government ownership of banks.           
On the other hand, in line with Wu and Bowe (2010) the results in column 3 and 
4 of Table 4 suggest that the net effect of Interbank deposits on capital becomes 
negative when the market becomes more concentrated. Since greater market 
concentration is linked with fewer players in the banking sector, banks will have 
lesser options to place their deposits. Our findings suggest that the collusive 
behavior of banks in a concentrated banking system could be the reason why 
Interbank deposits fail to be an effective market discipline tool.   
The findings also show that greater concentration in the banking sector as 
measured by both the ratios is linked to lower capital holdings when disclosure and 
the interaction term of disclosure and market concentration are included in the 
model. However, both of the market concentration variables are linked to higher 
capital holdings when interbank deposits and the interaction term of interbank 
deposits and market concentration are controlled for. This suggests that the effects 
of concentration variables on capital holdings are sensitive to the type of market 
discipline variables used.  
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Table 4. Market Concentration and Market Discipline 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Information 
-137.4*** -62.79***   
(39.71) (16.02)   
Information *CR4 
2.434***    
(0.699)    
Information *HHI 
 443.0***   
 (110.1)   
Interbank Deposits 
  7.840*** 2.576*** 
  (1.456) (0.430) 
Interbank Deposits *CR4 
  -0.135***  
  (0.026)  
Interbank Deposits*HHI 
   -14.45*** 
   (2.505) 
CR4 
-29.31***  1.689***  
(8.364)  (0.443)  
HHI 
 -5,227***  157.6*** 
 (1,293)  (45.19) 
ROA 
1.437*** 1.421*** 1.987*** 2.209*** 
(0.297) (0.338) (0.280) (0.288) 
NPL/Loans 
0.449*** 0.488*** 0.347*** 0.358*** 
(0.160) (0.170) (0.114) (0.110) 
Log Assets 
-6.017*** -1.220 -6.300*** -7.023*** 
(2.139) (3.198) (1.260) (1.250) 
Government Owned 
6.847 6.015 11.19** 10.26* 
(11.07) (13.95) (5.299) (5.411) 
Foreign Owned 
0.0220 5.936 -1.187 -5.655 
(10.05) (12.64) (4.951) (5.253) 
Listed 
-8.365 -2.992 2.514 9.319* 
(9.536) (11.32) (4.757) (4.790) 
Recapitalised 
-2.616 -2.593 -0.395 2.142 
(12.89) (16.26) (6.260) (6.367) 
GDP Growth 
-0.710** -0.656** 0.154 0.0347 
(0.334) (0.322) (0.224) (0.200) 
GDP Per Capita 
-0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Country Dummy 
8.666** 12.36*** 1.777 0.665 
(3.532) (4.487) (1.701) (1.655) 
Year 
2.549*** 2.880*** 1.637*** 1.602*** 
(0.483) (0.589) (0.403) (0.390) 
Constant 
-3,364*** -5,013*** -3,284*** -3,134*** 
(906.1) (1,114) (800.2) (776.5) 
Observations 513 513 443 443 
Banks 117 117 102 102 
Goodness of Fit 0.115 0.153 0.176 0.212 
Wald chi (2) 64.72*** 56.19*** 123.38*** 131.85*** 
Standard errors in parentheses and *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Further analyses are carried out to identify the effect of market discipline upon 
four distinct groups of banks, namely foreign owned, government owned, listed 
and recapitalized. The foreign owned banks are controlled by foreign shareholders 
while the government owned banks are controlled by the government. Listed banks 
are publicly quoted on a stock exchange. Recapitalized banks are the ones that have 
received one or more injections of capital. The results in Table 5 show that 
government owned banks, foreign banks and recapitalized banks hold significantly 
lower capital. On the contrary, listed banks hold significantly higher capital. We find 
that the interaction term between Information and ownership variables are positive 
and significant. This suggests that government owned, foreign owned and 
recapitalized banks are able to raise capital by disclosing more risk related 
information to public. Listed banks are under greater public scrutiny as they are 
required to disclose risk related information to public on a more regularly basis 
compared to other banks. However, results in column 3 show that greater disclosure 
by listed banks is linked to lower capital holdings. This implies that disclosure is not 
an effective market discipline tool for listed banks as observed by Wu and Bowe 
(2010).     
Banks’ ability to attract interbank deposits partly reflects how their risk profiles 
are perceived externally. Hence, banks that regularly seek funding in the interbank 
market are expected to hold higher capital. Results in columns 5 to 8 of Table 5 
confirm that banks that rely more on the interbank market do indeed hold higher 
capital. However, the operation of any disciplining effect is not evident for 
government owned, foreign owned and recapitalized banks. Column 7 indicates 
that Listed*Interbank is negative and significant, suggesting that listed banks that 
borrow more funds from the interbank market hold a lower level of capital. This 
could be due to fact that they are more reliant on equity funding compared to 
wholesale funding from the interbank market.        
Non-performing loans ratio indicates the quality of banks’ loan portfolio.  
Similar to Wu and Bowe (2010), we test the effectiveness of market discipline in 
improving banks prudential behavior for a given quality of loan portfolio. Greater 
disclosure of risk related information exposes banks to greater scrutiny and more 
disciplining action by stakeholder. For a given loan portfolio, we identify whether 
greater risk related disclosure induces banks to hold more capital. This is done by 
including the interaction term of Information and NPL ratio. Results in Table 6 
show that the coefficient on non-performing loans ratio is negative and significant 
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for all specifications. This indicates that banks with poor loan quality hold lower 
capital. The coefficients of the interaction terms of Information and NPL ratio are 
significant and positive. This confirms that banks that disclose more risk related 
information hold more risk-weighted capital for a given quality of loans.   
 
Table 5. Ownership Structures and Market Discipline 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Information 
-15.41*** -17.20*** 35.35* -15.06***     
(5.820) (4.561) (20.13) (4.886)     
Information* 
Gov. Owned 
11.95**        
(5.761)        
Information* 
For. Owned 
 20.70***       
 (4.862)       
Information* 
Listed 
  -34.79*      
  (20.18)      
Information* 
Recaplitalised 
   12.26**     
   (5.691)     
Interbank Deposits 
    0.475*** 0.0650 0.943*** 0.504*** 
    (0.090) (0.234) (0.150) (0.0921) 
Interbank Dep.* 
Gov. Owned 
    0.152    
    (0.165)    
Interbank Dep.* 
For. Owned 
     0.174   
     (0.242)   
Interbank Dep.* 
Listed 
      -0.626**  
      (0.248)  
Interbank Dep.* 
Recapilatised 
       -0.391 
       (0.287) 
ROA 
1.127*** 1.208*** 0.775 1.138*** 1.948*** 1.799*** 2.357*** 1.959*** 
(0.265) (0.257) (0.596) (0.267) (0.213) (0.209) (0.265) (0.215) 
NPL/Loans 
-0.0781 0.230** 0.268 -0.0122 0.395*** 0.385*** 0.436*** 0.382*** 
(0.126) (0.110) (0.178) (0.112) (0.080) (0.079) (0.092) (0.080) 
Log Assets 
-2.690* -0.819 -4.334*** -2.749* -4.751*** -5.378*** -4.471*** -4.632*** 
(1.548) (1.507) (1.335) (1.455) (0.646) (0.579) (0.733) (0.624) 
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Table 5. Continued 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Government Owned 
-152.0**    0.0212    
(77.23)    (3.047)    
Foreign Owned 
 -260.1***    -1.642   
 (62.25)    (3.088)   
Listed 
  436.5*    16.30***  
  (255.8)    (3.825)  
Recapitalised 
   -159.1**    5.567 
   (76.70)    (3.622) 
GDP Growth 
-0.0951 -0.199 0.0227 -0.153 0.0922 0.126 0.0914 0.0952 
(0.231) (0.227) (0.480) (0.233) (0.198) (0.196) (0.229) (0.199) 
GDP Per Capita 
0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001** 0.001*** 0.001 0.001** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Country Dummy 
2.707* 3.006** 1.107 3.090* 0.579 1.179* -0.381 0.511 
(1.605) (1.512) (1.618) (1.711) (0.726) (0.697) (0.859) (0.726) 
Year 
2.827*** 2.787*** 0.765 3.015*** 2.011*** 1.851*** 1.575*** 1.941*** 
(0.547) (0.492) (0.945) (0.575) (0.321) (0.345) (0.383) (0.325) 
Constant 
-5,408*** -5,333*** -1,901 -5,790*** -3,955*** -3,621*** -3,095*** -3,816*** 
(1,053) (955.7) (1,746) (1,113) (639.7) (689.7) (763.7) (648.5) 
Observations 513 513 513 513 443 443 443 443 
Banks 117 117 117 117 102 102 102 102 
Goodness of Fit 0.297 0.252 0.137 0.139 0.387 0.390 0.301 0.380 
Wald chi (2) 69.94*** 82.43*** 41.43*** 65.37*** 0.292.32*** 270.78*** 223.80*** 269.84*** 
Standard errors in parentheses and *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6. Risk Management and Market Discipline 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Information 
-22.52*** -21.81*** -22.99*** 
(4.717) (4.201) (4.637) 
Information * NPL 
1.112*** 1.095*** 1.133*** 
(0.178) (0.163) (0.178) 
CR4 
 0.429*  
 (0.243)  
HHI 
  14.16 
  (28.69) 
ROA 
0.0418 0.0692 0.0413 
(0.305) (0.292) (0.308) 
NPL/Loans 
-14.40*** -14.21*** -14.68*** 
(2.326) (2.130) (2.329) 
Log Assets 
-4.113** -3.428** -3.661** 
(1.780) (1.726) (1.735) 
Government Owned 
5.949 5.212 5.119 
(8.869) (8.163) (8.333) 
Foreign Owned 
18.61** 18.41** 18.80** 
(8.444) (7.751) (7.946) 
Listed 
15.03* 11.54 14.36** 
(7.713) (7.021) (7.321) 
Recapitalised 
7.742 6.976 7.522 
(10.42) (9.568) (9.769) 
GDP Growth 
-0.190 -0.331 -0.218 
(0.205) (0.224) (0.217) 
GDP Per Capita 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Country Dummy 
0.152 1.482 0.396 
(2.233) (2.205) (2.229) 
Year 
2.557*** 2.644*** 2.613*** 
(0.441) (0.440) (0.462) 
Constant 
-4,757*** -4,978*** -4,872*** 
(854.0) (860.1) (899.2) 
Observations 513 513 513 
Banks 117 117 117 
Goodness of Fit 0.187 0.191 0.183 
Wald chi (2) 116.99*** 125.01*** 114.2*** 
Standard errors in parentheses and *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper analyses the effectiveness of market discipline in enhancing prudential 
risk management practices among the East Asian banks. More specifically, it 
studies the role of information disclosure and interbank deposits in influencing 
banks’ management of capital ratio. A sample of 122 banks from five countries 
(Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand) is analyzed over the period 
from 1995 to 2005. This is a crucial period for the East Asian banking system 
during which the financial crisis happened and major financial restructuring were 
initiated. The present study aims to identify the effect of these changes on the market 
discipline mechanism. From an emerging market perspective, the findings of this 
study will enable us to answer a very pertinent question as to whether greater 
market concentration discourages prudential risk management practices. This is a 
very pertinent question that we need to address in the context of the East Asian 
banking system given the fact that major consolidation has taken place in the sector 
after the Asian financial crisis. In addition, this study also aims to identify how the 
ownership structure of the banks influences market discipline. 
We find evidence of market discipline operating through interbank deposits but 
not through disclosure. However, we find that greater market concentration reduces 
banks’ incentive to hold capital and improves the effectiveness of information 
disclosure as market discipline tool. Prior to the crisis, banks in East Asia lacked 
transparency (MacDonald, 1998) and some of the information that were disclosed 
did not reflect the actual risk that the banks were exposed to (Rosengren, 1999). 
Regulators in East Asia took steps to improve financial disclosure after the crisis 
by adopting International Accounting Standards and mandating greater and more 
frequent disclosure requirement (OECD, 2003). This may be the reason why 
disclosure becomes an effective market discipline tool as the banks become more 
concentrated. Similar to Wu and Bowe (2010), we find that interbank deposits fail 
to become an effective market discipline tool when the market becomes more 
concentrated. This suggests that lack of competition in the banking sector reduces 
the effectiveness of interbank deposits as a market discipline tool.    
When the ownership structure of the banks is taken into account, we find that 
government owned banks, foreign banks and recapitalized banks are subject to 
market disciplining effect when disclosure is taken into account. But, this is not 
the case when interbank deposits are considered. In addition, we find that greater 
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disclosure and interbank funding induce listed banks to hold lower capital. This 
suggests that listed banks in East Asia are not subjected to market disciplining 
effect. Similarly, Wu and Bowe (2010) also find that listed banks in China are not 
sensitive to market disciplining effect. Finally, we find that banks with poor loan 
quality hold lower capital, but for a given quality of loans, banks that disclose more 
risk related information hold more capital. This suggests that disclosure 
encourages banks with low quality loans to be more prudent. 
The empirical evidence presented in this paper confirms the effectiveness of 
market discipline in the East Asian banking system. Greater concentration in the 
banking increases the effectiveness of disclosure as market disciplining tool. As a 
result, regulators need to ensure that the disclosure requirements of the banks are 
further enhanced so that banks disclose pertinent information to general public on 
timely manner. This puts the banks under greater scrutiny and can help in elevating 
the moral hazard problem associated with big players in the banking sector.         
 
Appendix 
 
Bank level disclosure index is constructed using the information obtained from 
BankScope database. The indices estimate the level of information that banks 
provide in their published financial statements on fifteen disclosure items. These 
indices show whether banks disclose information relating different type of risk that 
they face such as interest rate risk, credit risk, liquidity risk, market risk and 
solvency risk. The composite index is defined as  
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where each sub-index Si, can be related to one or more sources of risk. The 
definition and the ordering of the fifteen sub-indices are based on the presentation in 
the BankScope database. The list of sub-indices used in the study is included in 
more detail below. A value of 0 is given for each of the sub-indices when there is 
no entry in any of the corresponding categories and a value of 1 otherwise. 
However, for the capital sub-index we assign a value of 0 when there is no entry 
in any of the four categories, 1 if there is only one entry, 2 if there are two entries 
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and 3 if there are three or four entries. Note that whenever a bank discloses 
information on three of these items, one can infer the fourth. As such, providing 
information on three items is therefore considered same as providing information 
on four items. This causes the maximum attainable score on the sum of the sub-
indices to be 17.  
 
Table 7. Disclosure Index 
 Sub-index Categories Basel Risk Category 
ASSETS    
Loans 
S1: Loans by Maturity 
Short-term loan (<1 year), 
Medium-term loan (<3 years) 
& Long-term loan (>3 years) 
Interest Rate Risk, 
Liquidity Risk 
S2: Loan by Type 
Mortgage Loan, Retail Loan, 
Commercial Loans, 
Loans to Banks and  
Other Loans 
Credit Risk 
S3: Problem Loans Total Impaired Loans Credit Risk 
S4: Problem Loans by Type 
Normal Loan, Special Mention 
Loan, Substandard Loan,  
Doubtful Loans and  
Restructured Loan 
Credit Risk 
Other Earning 
Assets 
S5: Investments by Type 
Loans and Advances to Banks 
Reverse Repos and Cash  
Collateral Securities,  
Investments in Property and  
Other Earning Assets 
Liquidity Risk 
S6: Securities by Type 
Trading Securities, Derivatives, 
Government Securities,  
Equity Investments, Other 
Liquidity Risk 
S7: Investments by Maturity 
Debt Securities, Senior Debt, 
Subordinated Debts,  
(<3 months, 3 to 12 months,  
1 to 5 years & > 5 years) 
Liquidity Risk 
LIABILITIES 
Deposits 
S8: Deposits by Maturity 
Retail and Other deposit 
(<3 months, 3 to 12 months,  
1 to 5 years & > 5 years)  
Interest rate Risk,  
Liquidity Risk 
S9: Deposits by Type 
Customer Deposit, Bank  
Deposit, Government / 
Municipalities Deposit 
Liquidity Risk 
S10: Long-term Funding 
Senior Debt, Subordinated 
Borrowing, Other Funding  
Liquidity Risk, 
Market Risk 
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Table 7. Continued 
 Sub-index Categories Basel Risk Category 
Memo Lines 
 
S11: Reserves Loan Loss Reserve Credit Risk 
S12: Capital  
Total Capital Ratio, Tier 1 Ratio, 
Total Capital, Tier 1 Capital 
Cushion for Risk 
S13: Off-balance Sheet Items 
Letter of Credit Issued,  
Bank Guarantee Letter, 
Total Contingent Liabilities 
Credit Risk 
INCOME STATEMENTS 
 S14: Non-interest Income 
Net Fees & Commission 
Income, Net Gain 
Market Risk 
 S15: Loan Loss Provisions Loan Loss Provisions Credit Risk 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Aggarwal, R. and K. T. Jacques. 1998. “Assessing the Impact of Prompt Corrective Action 
on Bank Capital and Risk,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review, 
vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 23-32. 
Arena, M. 2008. “Bank Failures and Bank Fundamentals: A Comparative Analysis of Latin 
America and East Asia during the Nineties Using Bank-Level Data,” Journal of Banking 
and Finance, vol. 32, no. 2, pp. 299-310. 
Asarkaya, Y. and S. Ozcan. 2007. “Determinants of Capital Structure in Financial Institutions: 
The Case of Turkey,” Journal of BRSA Banking and Financial Markets, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 
91-109. 
Ayuso, J., Pérez, D. and J. Saurina. 2004. “Are Capital Buffers pro-Cyclical? Evidence from 
Spanish Panel Data,” Journal of Financial Intermediation, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 249-264. 
Baer, H. and E. Brewer. 1986. “Uninsured Deposits as a Source of Market Discipline: Some 
New Evidence,” Economic Perspectives, vol. 10, no. 5, pp. 23-31. 
Barth, J. R., Caprio, G. and R. Levine. 2004. “Bank Regulation and Supervision: What Works 
Best?,” Journal of Financial Intermediation, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 205-248.  
Berger, A. N. 1991. “Market Discipline in Banking,” In Proceedings from Conference on 
Bank Structure and Competition. Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. pp. 419-437. 
Bliss, R. R. 2004. Market Discipline: Players, Processes, and Purposes. In Hunter, W., 
Kaufman G., Borio, C. and K. Tsatsaronis. (eds.) Market Discipline Across Countries and 
Industires. Boston: MIT Press. 
Bliss, R. R. and M. J. Flannery. 2002. “Market Discipline in the Governance of US Bank 
Holding Companies: Monitoring vs. Influencing,” European Finance Review, vol. 6, no. 
3, pp. 361-395. 
56 Fazelina Sahul Hamid and Norhanishah Mohd Yunus 
ⓒ Korea Institute for International Economic Policy 
Blum, J. M. 2002. “Subordinated Debt, Market Discipline, and Bank’s Risk Taking,” Journal 
of Banking and Finance, vol. 26, no. 7, pp. 1427-1441. 
Boot, A. W. and A. Schmeits. 2000. “Market Discipline and Incentive Problems in Conglomerate 
Firms with Applications to Banking,” Journal of Financial Intermediation, vol. 9, no. 3, 
pp. 240-273. 
Borio, C., Furfine, C. and P. Lowe. 2001. Procyclicality of the Financial System and Financial 
Stability: Issues and Policy Options. In Marrying the Macro- and Micro- Prudential 
Dimensions of Financial Stability. BIS Papers, no. 1, pp. 1-57. 
Calomiris, C. W. and J. R. Mason. 1997. “Contagion and Bank Failures During the Great 
Depression: The June 1932 Chicago Banking Panic,” American Economic Review, vol. 
87, no. 5, pp. 863-883. 
Cook, D. O. and L. J. Spellman. 1994. “Repudiation Risk and Restitution Costs : Toward 
Understanding Premiums on Insured Deposits,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 
vol. 26. no. 3, part 1, pp. 439-459. 
Cordella, T. and E. Levy Yeyati. 1998. “Public Disclosure and Bank Failures, ” IMF Staff Papers, 
vol, 45, no. 1, pp. 110-131 
De Nicoló, G., Jalal, A. M. and J. H. Boyd. 2006. Bank Risk-Taking and Competition 
Revisited: New Theory and New Evidence. IMF Working Papers, no. 06-297. 
Diamond, D. W. and P. H. Dybvig. 1986. “Banking Theory, Deposit Insurance, and Bank 
Regulation,” Journal of Business, vol. 59, no. 1, pp. 55-68. 
Diamond, D. W. and R. G. Rajan. 2000. “A Theory of Bank Capital,” Journal of Finance, 
vol. 55, no. 6, pp. 2431-2465. 
Ellis, D. M. and M. J. Flannery. 1992. “Does the Debt Market Assess Large Banks, Risk?: 
Time Series Evidence from Money Center CDs,” Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 
30, no. 3, pp. 481-502. 
Flannery, M. J. 1994. “Debt Maturity and the Deadweight Cost of Leverage: Optimally 
Financing Banking Firms,” American Economic Review, vol. 84, no. 1, pp. 320- 331. 
______. 2001. “The Faces of Market Discipline,” Journal of Financial Services Research, 
vol. 20, no. 2, pp. 107-119. 
Flannery, M. J. and K. P. Rangan. 2008. “What Caused the Bank Capital Build-up of the 
1990s?,” Review of Finance, vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 391-429. 
Fonseca, A. R. and F. Gonzalez. 2010. “How Bank Capital Buffers Vary across Countries: 
The Influence of Cost of Deposits, Market Power and Bank Regulation,” Journal of 
Banking and Finance, vol. 34, no. 4, pp. 892-902. 
Gambacorta, L. and P. E. Mistrulli. 2004. “Does Bank Capital Affect Lending Behavior?,” 
Journal of Financial Intermediation, vol. 13, no. 4, pp. 436-457. 
Goldberg, L. G. and S. C. Hudgins. 1996. “Response of Uninsured Depositors to Impending 
S&L Failures: Evidence of Depositor Discipline,” Quarterly Review of Economics and 
Finance, vol. 36, no. 3, pp. 311-325. 
______. 2002. “Depositor Discipline and Changing Strategies for Regulating Thrift 
Institutions,” Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 63, no. 2, pp. 263-274. 
Greenspan, A. 2001. The Financial Safety Net. In Remarks to the 37th Annual Conference 
on Bank Structure and Competition. Chicago, IL: Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. 
 Market Discipline and Bank Risk Taking: Evidence from the East Asian Banking Sector 57 
ⓒ 2017 East Asian Economic Review 
Gropp, R. and F. Heider. 2009. What Can Corporate Finance Say about Banks’ Capital 
Structures. European Central Bank Working Paper, no. 1096. 
Gropp, R. and J. Vesala. 2004. “Deposit Insurance, Moral Hazard and Market Monitoring,” 
Review of Finance, vol. 8, no. 4, pp. 571-602. 
Hamalainen, P., Hall, M. and B. Howcroft. 2001. A Framework for Implementing Market 
Discipline in Financial Regulatory Design. Loughborough University Banking Centre. 
______. 2003. Market Discipline: A Theoretical Framework for Regulatory Policy Development. 
In Kaufman G. (eds.) Market Discipline in Banking: Theory and Evidence. United Kingdom: 
Emerald. pp. 57-97. 
Hamid, F. S. 2013. “The Effect of Reliance on International Funding on Banking Fragility: 
Evidence from East Asia,” Margin: The Journal of Applied Economic Research, vol. 7, 
no. 1, pp. 29-60. 
______. 2014. “Information Disclosure and Depositor Discipline : Evidence Based on the 
East Asian Crisis,” Journal of Asian Development Studies, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 16-40. 
Hassan, O. and C. Marston. 2010. Disclosure Measurement in the Empirical Accounting 
Literature: A Review Article. London: Brunel University Uxbridge. 
Hoang, K. TA., Faff, R. and M. Haq. 2014. “Market Discipline and Bank Risk Taking,” 
Australian Journal of Management, vol. 39, no. 3, pp. 327-350. 
Hosono, K., Iwaki, H. and K. Tsuru. 2005. Banking Crises, Deposit Insurance, and Market 
Discipline: Lessons from the Asian Crises. RIETI Discussion Paper Series, no. 05-E-029. 
Ito, T. and Y. Hashimoto. 2007. Bank Restructuring in Asia: Crisis Management in the 
Aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis and Prospects for Crisis Prevention- Malaysia. 
RIETI Discussion Paper Series, no. 07-E-039. 
Jacques, K. and P. Nigro. 1997. “Risk-Based Capital, Portfolio Risk, and Bank Capital: A 
Simultaneous Equations Approach,” Journal of Economics and Business, vol. 49, no. 6, 
pp. 533-547. 
Jokipii, T. and A. Milne. 2008. “The Cyclical Behaviour of European Bank Capital Buffers,” 
Journal of Banking and Finance, vol. 32, no. 8, pp. 1440-1451. 
Kim, D. and A. M . Santomero. 1998. “Risk in Banking and Capital Regulation,” Journal of 
Finance, vol. 43, no. 5, pp. 1219-1233. 
Kleff, V. and M. Weber. 2008. “How Do Banks Determine Capital? Evidence from Germany,” 
German Economic Review, vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 354-372. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F. and A. Shleifer. 2002. “Government Ownership of Banks,” 
Journal of Finance, vol. 57, no. 1, pp. 265-301. 
Laeven, L. 1999. Risk and Efficiency in East Asian Banks. World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper, no. 2255.  
Laeven, L. and R. Levine. 2009. “Bank Governance, Regulation, and Risk Taking,” Journal 
of Financial Economics, vol. 93, no. 2, pp. 259-275. 
MacDonald, S. B. 1998. “Transparency in Thailand’s 1997 Economic Crisis: The Significance of 
Disclosure,” Asian Survey, vol. 38, no. 7, pp. 688-702. 
Marston, C. L. and P. J. Shrives. 1991. “The Use of Disclosure Indices in Accounting Research: 
A Review Article,” British Accounting Review, vol. 23, no. 3, pp. 195-210. 
58 Fazelina Sahul Hamid and Norhanishah Mohd Yunus 
ⓒ Korea Institute for International Economic Policy 
Martinez Peria, M. S. and S. L. Schmukler. 1999. Do Depositors Punish Banks for ‘Bad’ 
Behavior?: Market Discipline in Argentina, Chile, and Mexico. World Bank Policy 
Research Paper, no. 2058. 
Micco, A., Panizza, U. and M. Yanez. 2007. “Bank Ownership and Performance. Does 
Politics Matter?,” Journal of Banking and Finance, vol. 31, no. 1, pp. 219-241. 
Nier, E. and U. Baumann. 2006. “Market Discipline, Disclosure and Moral Hazard in 
Banking,” Journal of Financial Intermediation, vol. 15, no. 3, pp. 332-361. 
OECD. 2003. White Paper on Corporate Governance in Asia. OECD Publishing. 
Rosengren, E. 1999. Will Greater Disclosure and Transparency Prevent the next Banking 
Crisis? In Hunter, W. C., Kaufman, G. G. and T. H. Krueger. (eds.) The Asian Financial 
Crisis: Origins, Implications, and Solutions, New York: Springer. pp. 369-376. 
Sironi, A. 2001. “Testing for Market Discipline in the European Banking Industry: Evidence 
from Subordinated Debt,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, vol. 35, no. 3, pp. 443-
472. 
Stolz, S. and M. Wedow. 2011. “Banks’ Regulatory Capital Buffer and the Business Cycle: 
Evidence for German Savings and Cooperative Banks,” Journal of Financial Stability, 
vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 98-110. 
Tabak, B. M., Noronha, A. C. and D. Cajueiro. 2011. “Bank Capital Buffers, Lending Growth 
and Economic Cycle: Empirical Evidence for Brazil,” In 2nd BIS CCA Conference on 
Monetary Policy, Financial Stability and the Business Cycle. 
Tadesse, S. 2006. “The Economic Value of Regulated Disclosure: Evidence from the Banking 
Sector,” Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, vol. 25, no. 1, pp. 32-70. 
Williams, J. and N. Nguyen. 2005. “Financial Liberalisation, Crisis, and Restructuring: A 
Comparative Study of Bank Performance and Bank Governance in South East Asia,” 
Journal of Banking and Finance, vol. 29, no. 8-9, pp. 2119-2154. 
Wu, Y. and M. Bowe. 2010. “Information Disclosure, Market Discipline and the Management 
of Bank Capital: Evidence from the Chinese Financial Sector,” Journal of Financial Services 
Research, vol. 38, no. 2, pp. 159-186. 
 
 
 
 
First version received on 19 January 2017 
Peer-reviewed version received on 10 March 2017 
Final version accepted on 21 March 2017 
 
 
 
©  2017 EAER articles are distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International 
License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and 
reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link 
to the Creative Commons license. 
